We study how best to reward innovators whose work builds on earlier innovations. Incentives to innovate are obtained by offering innovators the opportunity to profit from their innovations. Since innovations compete, awarding rights to one innovator reduces the value of the rights to prior innovators. We show that the optimal allocation involves shared rights, where more than one innovator is promised a share of profits from a given innovation. We interpret such allocations in three ways: as patents that infringe on prior art, as licensing through an optimally designed ever-growing patent pool, and as randomization through litigation. We contrast the rate of technological progress under the optimal allocation with the outcome if sharing is prohibitively costly, and therefore must be avoided. Avoiding sharing initially slows progress, and leads to a more variable rate of technological progress.
Introduction
An important question in the economics of innovation is how to structure rewards for innovators. A long list of authors have argued that because an innovation's quality is unobservable, rewards must take the form of rights to profit from the innovation, rather than a simple procurement contract.
1 This manifests itself in the public policy through patents, and in private contracts through licensing agreements that pay royalties.
A more recent debate has addressed how to reward cumulative innovations. When one innovation will be built upon by future innovators, how should the rights of the earlier innovator be balanced against the rewards of those who come later? In this paper we address the role of sharing across innovators in the efficient reward of innovators under incomplete information of the sort that motivates patents and royalty payments.
We show that, in a contracting environment that supports arbitrary ex ante sharing agreements, the optimal allocation involves shared rights: history does not imply a unique firm with rights to the profit flows that arise from the current state of the art.
We study the optimal evolution of the sharing rules. We then contrast those allocations with regimes where institutional arrangements do not allow for sharing, and show that lack of sharing leads to more variable and possibly slower technological progress. Sharing in our model relates to commonly observed practices in patents and licensing.
Patents offer protection from competition in two ways: (1) competing innovations might be excluded by being deemed unpatentable and infringing on the initial patent; and (2) a later innovation might be patentable but still infringe on the earlier patent. In the second case, rents from the new innovation may be shared through a licensing contract where both firms gain a fraction of additional profit generated by their joint product. In cases where many innovators contribute to a common technology, more contributors are eligible to share the profits. For instance, in a patent pool, many firms can potentially get a share of the future profits from the patents under license. The recent literature on weak patent rights argues that randomization through litigation is a pervasive feature 1 John Stuart Mill (1883) famously wrote that patents are useful "because the reward conferred by it depends upon the invention's being found useful, and the greater the usefulness, the greater the reward."
of current patent policy. Randomization can be viewed as shared rights, in the sense that several patent holders have a probabilistic claim to future profits. Our model, then, provides a rationale for these observed practices.
Our model features a sequence of innovators who make quality improvements on one another, i.e., later innovators stand on the shoulders of those who came before. Ideas for making improvements arrive randomly. An innovator with an idea can develop a product with a quality that is one unit greater than the previous maximum quality after paying a one-time cost to implement his idea. This cost is innovator-specific but is drawn from a common distribution. To maximize welfare, a social planner would like to implement any idea whose cost is lower than its social benefit. The central question, then, is how to reward innovators so that they are willing to pay the costs.
Without any sort of frictions, rewarding innovations is a trivial problem: each innovator can be compensated for his contribution through a monetary payment. However, neither an innovator's expenditure toward the improvement nor the quality of his product can be verified by the planner in our model. This moral hazard problem leads to a situation where an innovator cannot be compensated through a monetary payment. Instead, the planner rewards the innovator with the opportunity to profit from innovations that embody his contribution. In contrast to a monetary payment, this reward ensures that the innovator has an incentive to pay the cost to develop his idea, because the qualities and hence profits of future products are contingent on the innovator's contribution.
Since we study a model of cumulative innovation, there is scarcity in this form of reward: market profits are limited and must be divided across innovators to provide incentives. Allocating this scarce resource is central to our problem. The planner must decide how to divide an innovator's reward between marketing his own innovation, perhaps excluding future innovators in the process, and allowing the innovator to share in profits from future innovations that build on his original contribution. If the planner excludes future innovators, this increases the incentive to the current innovator by lengthening the time during which the innovator can market his innovation. In Hopenhayn et al. (2006) , sufficient conditions are developed such that these exclusion rights are the only reward the innovator receives; when an improvement arrives, the existing innovator's right to profit ends. By contrast, the planner in our environment always gives innovators a stake in future innovations; this also means that multiple firms have rights to the profit flows at a moment in time.
One can equally interpret the planner's allocation in our environment as the outcome of a license that maximizes ex ante surplus among innovators, or as arising from a normative policy design problem. As such, one can interpret the shared rights as reflecting licensing features such as patent pools, or policy choices such as weak patent rights.
When shared rights take the form of a patent pool, the pool must be ever-growing since our sharing rule involves an ever-improving product. Firms do not simply sell their rights but rather share in the profits of future innovations. The proceeds from the state of the art are divided among the innovators according to a preset rule: a constant share is given to every new innovator when he is allowed into the pool, while old innovators'
shares are reduced proportionally to make room.
The optimal ex ante licensing contract brings to light a new sense in which a patent pool might be "fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory" (FRAND). FRAND licensing is a standard metric for judging patent pools, but existing interpretations of FRAND pertain to the patent pool's treatment of the users of the pooled patents, which in our model are consumers. Our model is silent on this issue; here the focus is on the rules by which innovators are allowed to join the pool. There is a preset price for an innovation to join, which is common to all potential innovators, and therefore the formation of the pool can be interpreted as FRAND with respect to new arrivals. One can interpret a policymaker's role here as to ensure treatment is FRAND even when contracts cannot be completely written ex ante.
The second interpretation of shared rights in our model is through a lottery among the risk-neutral innovators who share the rights, where a winner keeps all future profits promised to both winner and loser. This matches the notion of weak patent rights in the literature, where the randomization is commonly interpreted as litigation.
The lottery interpretation sheds light on both the cost and the benefit of shared rights. On the cost side, shared rights may require specific institutions for conflict resolution, since sharing may lead to contracting issues or legal conflict. Because the innovators are not neutral with respect to the outcome of the lottery, there is an incentive to spend resources to rig the lottery or lobby the planner to report that the lottery came out in their favor. Interpreting the lottery as litigation, the court allows the innovators to hire lawyers and experts to increase their chances of winning the lawsuit. Such spending can be interpreted as a wasteful cost of sharing.
The lottery interpretation makes it clear that sharing, either in the form of litigation or licensing contracts, has the benefit of being a convexification device for the planner.
Without it, the planner must choose to grant rights entirely to one innovator or another, rather than choosing something in between. Viewed in this light, the policy with sharing naturally leads to smoother levels of total rights granted than the policy without sharing.
If sharing is possible, the optimal policy implements smooth innovation: improvements arrive at a constant rate and different arrivals generate equal expected net social benefits.
The model also predicts sharing is forever part of the optimal allocation, in that every improvement leads to shares for both the prior art and the current improvement. Those shares can be accomplished through random litigation, where a new innovator wins and replaces the old with fixed odds. Initially the litigation is between the initial innovator and follow-up improvements, but as time goes on the conflict is more likely to be between innovators who invent different improvements.
Our sharing contract embodies a great deal of ex ante licensing agreements that may be impossible to implement in many environments. Rather than modeling the imperfections of contracting explicitly, our model allows us to assess the impact if the planner must avoid sharing completely. Without sharing, rights never come into conflict, in the sense that when the next improvement is implemented, there is unambiguously no property right left for past innovators. The allocation without sharing can be thought of as a sequence of patents that do not infringe on prior art, so that no issue of licensing arises.
2 When sharing is avoided, the allocation of rights is distorted. The arrival of improvements follows a less smooth path, bypassing some higher net benefit ideas at the beginning and implementing other less-attractive ideas later on. We show that, in 2 Such situations can be decentralized through simple sales of patents or through a buyout scheme, as studied in Hopenhayn et al. (2006) . such cases, the lack of sharing can lead to perpetual cycles in technological progress, in contrast to the smooth progress that results from allocations with sharing.
Related literature Our paper relates to several strands of the patent literature. It takes up, in the spirit of Green and Scotchmer (1995) , Scotchmer (1996) , O'Donoghue et al. (1998) , O'Donoghue (1998), and Hopenhayn et al. (2006) , among others, the allocation of patent rights when early innovations are an input into the production of subsequent innovations, and therefore rights granted to a later innovator reduce the value of rights granted to an earlier innovator. We study, in a model where patents are the result of information frictions as in Scotchmer (1999) , the sharing question of Green and Scotchmer (1995) and Bessen (2004) . We study both the evolution of sharing and the implications of the lack of sharing. Our optimal policy generates a patentability requirement (a minimum requirement for a patent to be awarded) in the spirit of Scotchmer (1996) and O'Donoghue (1998). The policy also implies situations where a new innovation is awarded protection but must share with prior art, which can be naturally interpreted as patent infringement, a feature of policy emphasized in O' Donoghue et al. (1998) . Since we derive sharing, patentability, and infringement from a problem with explicit incomplete information, we provide an informational foundation for the optimal policies studied in many papers on cumulative innovation.
Our model also provides a new interpretation of patent pools. Existing models treat patent pools as similar to mergers; for instance, Lerner and Tirole (2004) show how the complementarity or substitutability of the different patents influences the efficiency of the pool. Lerner et al. (2007) extend this approach to analyze the sharing rules that underlie joint production in a pool. Our interpretation offers a different view of patent pools: patent pools split rights among competing innovators in a way that gives incentives for new members to produce innovations that enhance the pool. In that sense, our work connects the sharing rules for patent pools with the incentive-to-innovate issue at the heart of the optimal patent literature.
Many environments take the probabilistic view of patent protection. This notion of weak patent rights is introduced in Shapiro (2003) , and the idea of patents being probabilistic is reviewed in Lemley and Shapiro (2005) . Whereas game theoretic models of litigation often take the outcome of litigation to be random, 3 our paper takes a different view: rather than assume patent rights are weak, we provide foundations for such environments, addressing the question of why a planner would choose an arrangement where patent rights are probabilistic. In this sense our paper provides an underpinning for models that assume probabilistic patent rights.
Our model is fundamentally driven by a desire to solve moral hazard problems between a group of agents. Classic models of moral hazard in teams date back at least to Holmstrom (1982) . Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) address sharing rules with double-sided moral hazard in the context of joint production between two agents, for instance between a franchisor and franchisee. Our model extends these ideas to a sequence of innovators and adds a fundamentally new trade-off that comes out of the dynamics: the planner can offer rewards either through sharing or through exclusion of future innovators. We therefore are able to assess the benefits of rules that involve sharing.
Organization The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The environment is described in Section 2. Section 3 describes optimal policies if sharing is costless. Section 4 discusses in more detail the interpretation of such policies as generating conflict. Section 5, motivated by these interpretations, takes the alternate view, constructing optimal policies without sharing. In Section 6 we compare and contrast the outcomes under the two scenarios and consider the possibility that the first innovator needs a greater reward, for instance because of the high cost of the initial innovation, or because it is less profitable than the follow-ups. Section 7 concludes, and we provide the proofs of all the results in an appendix.
3 Examples are numerous. First, papers that are more general than models of patent litigation include Bebchuk (1984) , Nalebuff (1987), and Posner (2003) . These papers study random litigation mostly in the context of incentives to settle pretrial. Second, papers on patent litigation include Meurer (1989) , Choi (1998) , and Aoki and Hu (1999) . Chou and Haller (2007) follow in the spirit of the weak patent literature and consider a sequential environment, as we do.
Model

Environment
The environment has an infinite horizon of continuous time. There are many innovators (who we sometimes call firms) and a patent authority (who we sometimes call the planner). Everyone is risk-neutral and discounts the future with a constant discount rate r. Firms maximize profits, while the planner maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and profits. We call an opportunity to generate an innovation an idea. Ideas arrive with
Poisson arrival rate λ. The idea comes to one of a continuum of innovators with equal probability, so that with probability one each innovator has at most one idea, and therefore an arrival can be treated as a unique event in the innovator's life. 4 Without loss of generality we normalize r = 1; one unit of time corresponds to 1/r units of time before the normalization. For now we treat arrivals as observable, but the optimal contract will screen in a way such that there would be no difference in the optimal allocation if arrivals were private information of the innovator.
When the idea arrives, the innovator draws a cost of development c from a continuous distribution F (c) with density f (c). To ensure that the planner's problem is convex, we assume that
is weakly increasing in c.
Assumption 2 (1 + λF (c))
Both assumptions are weaker than the assumption that
weakly decreases in c.
Many distributions, including uniform, normal, exponential, gamma, and Pareto, have a monotonic
.
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The draw of c is private information of the innovator. Investment of c leads to an innovation. Innovations generate higher and higher quality versions of the same good. 4 Hopenhayn and Mitchell (2011) study a cumulative problem where ideas arrive to a small number of innovators. 5 For a more complete list of distributions with log-concave cumulative distribution functions, see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) .
Ideas are perishable, so the investment must be made immediately after the idea arrives, or it is lost. Every innovation generates a product with quality q that is one unit greater than the previous maximum quality. In other words, the nth innovation is a product of quality n. We assume there is a single consumer who demands either zero or one physical unit of the good. The benefit to the consumer of the good when quality is q and price is p is q − p. The consumer has an outside option of zero. Firms compete in prices, with no cost of production. This implies that exclusive access to the most recent B innovations allows the exclusive rights holder to sell one unit for a price of B, and make B units of profits. In other words, if the next highest product allowed to be sold is m, then B = n − m.
As in Hopenhayn et al. (2006) we assume that there is no static distortion present.
Since we are interested in the conflict that arises between early and late innovators when rights are scarce, we focus on the role of dynamic forces exclusively; static monopoly distortions can be added to the model with straightforward results. Therefore market structure only determines the split of the surplus among various firms and the consumer, and can be used as a reward.
The planner determines the market structure at every point in time. This choice can be completely summarized by an identity of an exclusive rights holder for the leadingedge product, and the breadth B which corresponds to the difference between that product and the next highest quality product that is allowed to be produced. 6 The planner can charge an entry fee in exchange for the rights granted; fees collected are rebated to the consumer lump-sum.
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We make two remarks about the planner's policy. First, the planner always allocates breadth from the frontier, i.e., the leading-edge product is always marketed. Allowing the leading-edge product to be marketed increases either the rights holder's profits, or, if higher fees are charged and rebated back to the consumer, the consumer surplus. Either way contributes to a higher level of social surplus. Second, the planner may allow no innovator to profit in a given instant by choosing B = 0. The choice of breadth for every history is made with full commitment power on the side of the planner. We study how the market structure affects innovators' incentives to invest next.
Incentives to Invest
So that the optimal reward structure is not simply a prize system, we assume there is moral hazard. Both the investment and the outcome are assumed to be unobserved by the planner. As in the literature on optimal patent design with asymmetric information, the moral hazard makes pure transfer policies impossible, since innovators would always prefer to underinvest and collect the prize. 8 We therefore focus on policies that reward innovators with the opportunity to market their innovations through the market structure choice.
We study the optimal policy recursively, but to build our recursive solution, we begin by imagining the solution as a choice of sharing rules as a function of the current history.
Such a history could potentially include past reports of information like the current quality of the state of the art, used to cross-check past innovators' contributions. We abstract from such cross-reporting contracts as they are fraught with bribery concerns (see Hopenhayn et al. (2006) ) and are studied in more detail in a literature following Kremer (1998) ; we allow the planner to condition only on the number of arrivals for which investment has and has not been made, as well as calendar time. We further assume, as in much of the patent literature, that the consumer is a passive player who cannot be made to give a report of quality, and market profits are not verifiable.
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Consider first market structures where there is always one seller who monopolizes the entire quality ladder, i.e., B = n. Suppose innovator i is endowed with an idea at date t. The planner rewards the innovator with a share s i x of the profits n x that arise at future dates x ≥ t. A critical feature of the optimal contract is the incentive to innovate; that is, the difference between the return from innovating (i.e., spending the cost) and not. The payoff, if he innovates, is
where the expectation is taken with respect to future states n x that may occur under different histories at period x. On the other hand, if the cost of developing the innovation is not paid, the future states will all be lower by one, and therefore the payoff is
That difference is simply
which we denote as d 1 . As in Hopenhayn et al. (2006) this can be interpreted as the innovator's expected discounted duration of rights, if one interprets s i x as the risk-neutral innovator's probability of being awarded the entire ladder at a future state and date.
Note that d 1 can never exceed one; were the planner to offer full monopoly to the innovator forever, he would receive d 1 = 1 and any cost type less than one would invest. If the planner has made prior promises, d 1 will be constrained by those promises and be less than one, so that not all cost types smaller than one will invest. This is the fundamental trade-off in the model: making promises implements more ideas but restricts the feasible set of future payoffs.
Since the difference in the innovator's payoffs between innovating and not innovating is exactly d 1 , we immediately conclude Corollary 1 An innovator invests if and only if c ≤ d 1 .
All rules for implementation are therefore cutoff rules, and we can speak of the set of implemented cost types and the promise of duration d 1 synonymously. Since the planner never wants to reward non-innovators, this rule is achieved by setting the fee equal to the profits of the marginal type, i.e., the fee equals
We treat the fee as welfare-neutral and do not discuss it further. Since a non-innovation generates zero profits, the planner need not be concerned about a firm overreporting arrivals, and therefore the policies constructed here are incentive compatible even if arrivals of ideas are private information.
If the breath is less than full (i.e., B x < n x ), then it may or may not provide incentives for innovator i to invest. If i < n x −B x , then the protection does not cover the innovator's contribution, hence does not generate incentives. The planner may equivalently set s i x = 0 and offer innovator i a transfer. If i ≥ n x − B x , then the protection B x does generate incentives and is equivalent to a market structure where protection is full but fees are higher by n x − B x . In either case, the allocation with less-than-full protection can be achieved by a market structure with full protection. Hence our restriction to full protection is without loss of generality.
Planner's Objective
Although the firm's private benefit from the innovation is d 1 , the social value of an innovation is 1; the increment to quality is always generating either profits or consumer surplus. Therefore the planner's payoff from a given innovation that is offered d 1 is
Since no innovator ever implements an idea with c > 1 (even if offered the maximum feasible d 1 = 1), we can assume R(·) is increasing without loss of generality.
At any point in time, the past history can be succinctly summarized by the sum of durations promised to all prior innovators; the duration available to subsequent innovators, at any history, is one minus this sum. History matters only because this is a full-commitment problem, and hence the planner must deliver on this promise. A greater promise limits what can be offered to future innovators, and this is the fundamental scarcity that leads to conflict and makes the solution differ from the first best.
Summarizing histories in this way allows us to characterize optimal policies recursively in the next section. The planner's value, V (d), is the maximized sum of social surpluses of all quality improvements in the future. The dynamic programming problem is
subject to the promise-keeping (PK) constraint
and the domain conditions for the durations and y that all must lie in [0, 1]. The key constraint is the PK constraint. It reflects, in the full-commitment problem the planner solves, a recursive approach to the contract: given the duration promise, the planner can deliver the promise in four ways. First, the planner can offer rights y. The planner can also meet the promise by incrementing the duration, either after an arrival (implemented or not) or after no arrival. The planner may freely dispose of instants by choosing y < 1 and leaving 1 − y unassigned to anyone. Under free disposal the planner is not forced to offer innovators more than what they are promised, making it feasible for the planner to satisfy (1) with an exact equality.
Our approach is to conjecture that the value function is concave; we verify this conjecture below. Under the conjecture we can use the first-order conditions and the envelope condition to immediately conclude that
Therefore we can write the problem more concisely as
Since y ≤ 1, the PK constraint (3) is equivalent to an inequality
When the planner finds instants scarce, so the PK constraint binds, he will want to set y = 1 to help meet the promise. Free disposal is essential for low promises d; in those cases, the planner may not want to deliver the low promise only by way of a high d 1 , but also through not allocating every possible instant to anyone.
Rearranging and combining like terms in (2) and (4), we have
To simplify notation, we defined ≡
The problem is rewritten as
As discussed above, we define sharing to be the allocation of rights to multiple innovators at the same history:
We describe in the next section the sense in which such policies might generate cost, and the sense in which policies that do not have such a structure are more easily adjudicated.
For now we simply state the definition, and study whether policies involve sharing, so defined.
It turns out that the nonnegativity constraint d 0 ≥ 0 in (5) binds only at low values of d and the value of V (d) at lower d depends on its value at higher d, where the nonnegativity constraint is slack. Because it is easier to solve for the value function without the nonnegativity constraint, we proceed in two steps. First in subsection 3.1, we remove the nonnegativity constraint d 0 ≥ 0 and obtain a relaxed problem (6). We guess and verify the solution to (6). Then in subsection 3.2, motivated by the solution to (6), we guess and verify the solution to the full problem (5).
A Relaxed Problem
Consider a relaxed problem in which d 0 ≥ 0 is not imposed.
We heuristically solve (6) as follows. Without loss we may assume that the PK constraint (7) holds with equality: because the lower bound of d 0 is removed in the relaxed problem, we can always reduce d 0 to achieve an equality even if (7) is initially not. Doing this weakly improves the right side of (6) because V r (·) is weakly decreasing (intuitively, more promises to prior innovators reduce surpluses generated by future innovators).
The first-order condition of d 0 implies that
If V r (·) is concave, the above suggests that
or equivalently
where h(·) is the inverse of F (d 1 )d 1 . Substituting policies (8) and (9) into (6) yields
Understanding the solution to this relaxed problem gives almost all of the intuition for the full problem. In the relaxed problem, the planner uses all instants; the PK constraint (7) holding with equality is equivalent to y = 1. The planner divides all the instants evenly, allocating a constant amount to all innovations given by
. As a result, the duration promise permanently stays at d, and the planner implements all costs types below the constant cutoff d 1 . This policy is optimal: Since the planner uses up all instants, the only way to deliver more to one arrival is to deliver less to another.
This deviation is suboptimal because of the convexity in implementation costs.
Of course, this policy has the feature that it cannot be the full solution, since for some promises d the constraint d 0 ≥ 0 in the full problem is violated. In particular Our heuristic derivation of (10) and the above discussion contain the intuition for why the constant sharing contract is optimal in the relaxed problem. This intuition, however, must be verified rigorously. We provide this formal verification argument below. 
Solving the Full Problem
relaxed problem, we make a reasonable conjecture that the optimal policy is d 0 = 0 when d 0 ≥ 0 is imposed. We thus use the right side of (6) to define, for d <d,
Lemma 1 The unconstrained maximum ofdλR(g(d))
, and the maximizer, denoted as d * , is strictly belowd. 
We verify below that V (·) is indeed the solution to the full problem.
Proposition 3 V (·) in (13) is concave and its derivative is continuous atd. It satisfies the Bellman equation (5), and hence it is the solution to the true sharing problem.
Corollary 2 For any initial d, the duration promise jumps immediately to a constant level. For initial d =d, this constant level is strictly greater thand, so d 0 and d 1 are both strictly positive, i.e., there is sharing forever.
Generically, the optimal policy jumps to a point where there is perpetual sharing, in the sense that multiple innovators are granted rights at every future history that arises.
Consider, for instance, the dynamics starting from a large initial duration promise; we discuss such a case in more detail in subsection 6.2. The PK constraint binds and d 0 > 0, so that when the next innovation is implemented, it will be implemented with sharing.
Example 1 (Uniform density) To further build understanding of the optimal policy, suppose that the density f is uniform on [0, 1] and λ = 1. In this case we can solve for the optimal policy analytically by solving polynomial equations. The fixed-pointd satisfiesd 2 +d = 1.
Henced is
, the golden ratio. The value function is
The analytical solution for d * can be found as
, and i ≡ √ −1. 
Interpreting the Optimal Contract with Sharing
The previous section defines sharing to be the case where both the current and past innovator are promised some time selling the leading-edge product; the optimal contract employs such sharing, from (at the latest) the second innovation onward. We describe here several interpretations of such a policy.
One interpretation of the optimal contract is as the design of an optimal policy for patents. We see, on the one hand, that some ideas would not be allowed to profit at all; ideas with cost greater than d 1 are not offered sufficient protection to be implemented. We interpret this as being unpatentable, although our mechanism design approach implies that this decision is made completely by the innovator and is not adjudicated by the planner; the planner simply sorts out what he seeks to be unpatentable by a sufficiently high patent fee.
On the other hand, innovations that are allowed to generate profits for the innovator (i.e., patents issued) share with prior patents. In practice, this could occur in several ways. For instance, when a new patent infringes on an old one, the two parties must come to a licensing agreement. Alternatively, if infringement is not clear, the firms could potentially engage in litigation. We argue that both outcomes can be interpreted as part of the optimal contract with sharing.
One preset rule that allocates rights with sharing is a lottery. Suppose there is one incumbent with a promise, d. When sharing is called for, the new innovator and the incumbent are prescribed d 1 and d 0 , respectively. Rather than maintain that promise for both firms, the planner could have a lottery: one of the two will be chosen to be the Under the licensing interpretation, the innovators form an ever-increasing pool of the patents that have arrived. It is similar to standard notions of a patent pool in the sense that many innovators have jointly contributed to the research line, and as such, they would share in the profits of their joint effort. Here, however, the pool is ever growing as a result of the ever-improving nature of the product. New innovators may join the pool for a fee; in exchange they receive a share of pool profits. Whenever a new innovator joins the pool, then, all the existing innovators' shares drop to make room.
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In the setup we have used, the existing innovators would never want to exclude a new innovator willing to pay the entry fee, even if they weren't obligated to by the commitment of the contract. To see this, notice that the marginal innovator c = d 1 makes zero profit from joining the pool and improves total pool profits by contributing an improvement; lower cost types contribute the same and get the same share, but make profits from their lower cost c < d 1 . However, if contracting could only take place after the new improvement spent c, there would be a simple hold-up problem. One can interpret the planner's role here as to limit this hold-up. To do so, the planner should insist on a "non-discriminatory" policy for new pool entrants that forces the pool to pre-specify the "fair" or "reasonable" price at which they will allow new members to join the pool, and accept membership from anyone who wants to pay the entry fee.
This gives a new role for regulation of patent pools. Policymakers have insisted that pools treat users of the pool's patents in a way that is FRAND.
12 The motivation for this policy is that a patent pool among a fixed set of innovators is like a merger between the members, and therefore care must be exercised to make sure that patent pools don't have the anticompetitive effects of mergers on the pool's users. 13 The model proposed here considers how pools should be allowed to contract with potential new members, given 11 In this alternate view of the optimal contract, one might imagine the fee is no longer collected by the central authority and rebated to consumers, but rather collected by the pool as a fee to new entrants. This alternate view is fine; the entry fee needs only be modified to account for not only the profits from the share of pool sales, but also the expected return to joining the pool in terms of future fees collected from later entrants. 12 See, for example, Lerner and Tirole (2008) . 13 This idea is the basis of the model of patent pools in Lerner and Tirole (2004) , where pools have welfare consequences similar to the ones found in models of mergers, based on monopoly markup by the pool.
the fact that new members increase total profits but erode pool members' share of the profits. To focus on the issue of how pools form, we specifically study a case where there are no welfare consequences of the pool's treatment of the users of the pool's product.
Note that policies without sharing can be implemented in a much simpler way from the licensing or litigation interpretations. Consider the optimal policy starting from d =d. In this case the policy can be decentralized through a rule that depends only on reports of arrivals. In particular, each arrival needs only to pay an entry fee, at which point they are given the sole right to profit; that is, a completely exclusionary patent that infringes on nothing, and allows the holder to exclude all past innovators. The innovator who most recently paid the fee unambiguously has all the rights.
Consider, by contrast, some initial d >d where there is forever d 0 > 0 and d 1 > 0.
Here decentralization requires something other than just reports of arrivals; sharing rules conditional on those reports are essential. We view all of these constructions as potentially generating costs relative to cases without sharing. In the next section we consider the extreme case, where sharing is so costly that the planner must avoid it altogether.
Conflict-Free Policies
Optimal policies in Section 3 included a particular sense of potential conflict, stemming from sharing between multiple rights holders promised at a given history. The planner could avoid this sort of conflict by restricting attention to policies without sharing, which, upon implementing a new innovation, ends the rights of previous rights holders. This translates to the same model of Section 3, but under the restriction that 
Optimal Policies
When d 0 = 0 is imposed in (5), the Bellman equation becomes
where W (·) denotes the conflict-free value function. 
Lemma 2 W (·) is weakly decreasing and concave in
To summarize, the optimal policy isd(d) = max(d, d * * ), or equivalently
The evolution of duration promises critically depends on d * * . As we will show, d * * is either equal to or belowd, with quite different dynamics of promises under the two cases.
If the density function is weakly decreasing, then d * * =d; if the density function is strictly increasing, then d * * <d.
The condition for d * * =d is that f (d) is bounded above by F (d)d −1 . To understand why the density cannot be too large in this case, consider the optimal path of duration promises. Denote the duration promise of the tth implemented idea as d t . When d * * =d, the optimal path is perfectly smoothed, i.e., d t =d for all t. Suppose we deviate and increase d 1 fromd tod + ǫ. For simplicity, assume that this deviation does not affect d t When d * * <d, the distinctive feature of the dynamics of duration promises is that they cycle. This is the clear sense in which a conflict-free policy always has more variable technological progress, which we discuss in more detail below. 
Dynamics without Sharing
When d * * <d, the states fluctuate aroundd because if
This further implies that
are aboved. Intuitively, when the current patent protection is large, the planner cannot implement many innovations, and therefore offers a small reward to potential innovators.
Once an innovator accepts the reward, the planner no longer has to deal with such a large patent in place, and therefore can promise more generous duration to the subsequent innovation. This generous duration promise brings the situation back to a high level of protection.
The two-period cycle in Proposition 5 can either be forever fluctuating (i.e., Proposition 6 Suppose d * * <d and the initial duration promise d =d.
(ii) If f (c) = αc α−1 and α is sufficiently large, then g(g(c)) < c for all c ∈ (d, b].
We end this section with numerical examples with power function density.
Example 2 (Power function density) Suppose that the density f (c) = αc α−1 for α > 1 and λ = 1. Figure 6 plots the policy function when α = 3: in a neighborhood of
is steeper than the 45-degree line and cycles are amplified over time. The sufficient condition in Proposition 6 is satisfied and the cycle lasts forever. However, when α is sufficiently large, the sufficient condition in Proposition 7 is satisfied and the states converge tod. Figure 7 plots the policy function when α = 6: in contrast to that in Figure 6 , d 1 (d 1 (·)) is flatter than the 45-degree line and cycles disappear in the long run.
Discussion
Comparison of Technological Progress With and Without
Sharing
Although welfare must be (weakly) lower without sharing, the impact on the rate of innovations is somewhat more complicated. First, we consider the case of d * * =d; in that case, there are no cycles in the conflict-free policy.
The Case of d * * =d
For any given d, the rate of innovation is weakly higher with sharing; it is strictly higher everywhere exceptd. This does not, however, imply that the long-run rate of progress is higher with sharing; the evolution of d t is endogenous, and since the planner with access to sharing is giving out more promises from any initial starting d, that leads to more constraints later on. Define d ss (d) to be the steady state value of duration starting from d; in both cases it is achieved after at most two improvements. Since steady state duration isd For any starting duration where sharing and non-sharing differ (d =d), the same pattern emerges: sharing leads to faster progress initially, but, as a result of the higher promises given out, the long-run progress is slower. The intuition is that, with sharing, the planner perfectly smooths the duration at his disposal, offering equal duration to every arrival. The planner prefers smooth paths because they don't bypass low-cost ideas at some points in time and implement higher-cost ideas later on. Without sharing, the planner can never achieve this smoothing if his promise rises aboved. To deliver the large duration promise, only the lowest-cost follow-up innovations are allowed; that 14 Although we could not prove d * < d * * analytically, it holds in all of our numerical examples.
In the next subsection, we further the point about sharing and convexification by describing an environment where the initial duration promise may be large, due to the special costs that might come with being a market pioneer. In that environment, the feature that non-sharing leads to faster long-run growth is restored, as the growth rate of the sharing contract is sufficiently low.
Application: Ironclad Patents and Rewarding a Market Pioneer
A fundamental force in the model is that rewards for innovation come through market profits, and those profits are limited. As such, it is natural to consider how the planner might respond to a special innovation that is essential to the development of the product but requires extra rewards in order to be implemented, such as a pioneering innovation that begins the process. We treat the required duration promise for the initial innovation as not stemming from the cost function or profitability described above. We imagine that the initial duration promise reflects the particulars of the original innovation; for instance, if the innovation were either not initially fully commercialized or very costly, the initial duration promise required would be very great. 15 The main goal is to show that this can map neatly into an initial duration promise anywhere in the unit interval, at which point one can use the analysis of the prior sections to assess how the planner proceeds with and without sharing.
We focus on the case where the promise d to the pioneer satisfies g(g(d)) = 1. The promise is large in the sense that the PK constraint binds with and without sharing. If sharing is possible, a high promise to the pioneer is realized by continuous sharing: the rate of implemented arrivals is constant, and that rate is lower the larger is the pioneer's promise. A larger promise translates to a greater share of future profits for the pioneer, and therefore only lower-cost improvements are profitable.
If sharing is impossible, an initial large promise d leads to an initial rate of progress lower than with sharing, as the high duration promise to the pioneer can only be realized 15 Robinson et al. (1994) document the higher costs of pioneering innovations.
through severe exclusion restrictions. One can think of such a patent as ironclad in the sense that it keeps many potential entrants out of the market. However, once an idea whose cost is lower than g(d) arrives, it will be implemented and break the ironclad patent. In other words, the pioneer's rights are stronger without sharing, but are fully gone sooner. Since the duration promise to the low-cost idea, g(d), is less than (1 + λ) −1 , PK constraint becomes slack immediately after the implementation of the low-cost idea.
The continuation contract starts afresh as if the planner is not committed to any duration promise. As we mentioned, sharing leads to smooth progress due to constant sharing with the pioneer, while avoiding conflict forces the planner to temporarily reduce progress, but allows progress to rise later on. This leads to a less smooth path of progress without sharing, which is costly to the planner.
Conclusion
In this paper we have constructed optimal allocations for a sequence of innovators who, due to moral hazard, must be rewarded with profit-making opportunities. We have shown that the optimal allocations involve sharing so that more than one firm get a share of future profits. We interpret this sharing as patents that infringe on prior art, together with licensing. We show how the licensing contract can be interpreted as an ever-growing patent pool and provide theoretical foundations for observed practices like patentability requirements and infringement, as well as weak patent rights. By constructing allocations that do not allow the planner to use shared rewards, we can explore the role of licensing contracts in technological progress. Sharing contracts lead to smoother progress. They also lead to faster progress initially.
We focus on the extreme case where the planner either uses sharing, or the cost of sharing is infinite. A natural topic for future research is to see what degree of sharing the planner would choose if faced with a finite cost of assigning shared rights. The trade-off in making that decision is highlighted by the analysis here: Sharing is valuable as a convexification device.
Proof of Proposition 1:
The concavity of the value function will be verified in Propositions 2, 3 and Lemma 1 of this paper. Let µ(d) be the Lagrange multiplier on the PK constraint (1). The first-order conditions ford andḋ are
, and henced = d. The envelope condition is
Proof of Proposition 2:
To show the monotonicity and concavity of V r (·), it is equivalent to show that V ′ r (d) is negative and decreasing in d.
, which is negative and increasing in d 1 under assumption 1. As
Next we verify the Bellman equation (6). Pick a feasible (d 0 ,d 1 ), and letd 2 ≡ h
, and the PK constraint, after simplification, becomes
The objective on the right side of (6) is
where the second inequality follows from (16). This verifies the Bellman equation.
Proof of Lemma 1:
To show that the objective in (11) is concave, note that Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2 show that both dR(g(d)) and (1 − d)V r (g(d)) are concave ind.
To show that d * <d, it is sufficient to verify that
it follows from Lemma A.3 that
Proof of Proposition 3:
The concavity of V (·) is shown in the proof of Lemma 1. To see that V ′ (·) is continuous atd, recall from the proof of Lemma 1 that
Finally we verify the Bellman equation when d <d,
where the second inequality follows from d * <d. Second, we assume without loss that d <d. Then the value of
where the first inequality relies on g(d) + x ≥d + (1 −d)x and the monotonicity of V ′ , and the second inequality relies on the monotonicity of V (·). We can easily verify that T satisfies the Blackwell's sufficient conditions and is a contraction mapping. Hence T has a unique fixed point W (·). To show that W (·) is weakly decreasing and concave, it is sufficient to prove that T maps any weakly decreasing and concave function w(·) into a weakly decreasing and concave function. It follows from Lemmas A.1 and A.2 that λdR(g(d))+(1−d)w(g(d)) is concave ind. Therefore, (T w)(·) is concave. The monotonicity of (T w)(·) follows from the fact that the feasibility set in the Bellman equation shrinks with higher d.
(ii) Necessity: If d * * =d, then By induction, the sequence {d 2t+1 ; t ≥ 0} is increasing in t. A symmetric argument shows that the sequence is decreasing in t if d 1 ≥ d 3 .
Proof of Proposition 6: Third, we show that g(g(c)) < c for c slightly aboved. It is sufficient to show that −g ′ (d) < 1, which follows from
where the inequality is shown in the second step. Proof of Lemma A.2:
Assumption 2 and g ′ (d) < 0 imply that
decreases in d. 
